Whenever that a hard-nosed analysis is put forth of whoour rulers are, of how their political and financial interests interlock, it is invariably denounced by Facility liberals and conservatives (and even by lots of libertarians) as a “conspiracy theory of history,” “paranoid,” “economic determinist,” and even “Marxist.” These smear labels are applied across the board, although such sensible analyses can be, and have been, made from any and all parts of the financial spectrum, from the John Birch Society to the Communist Celebration. The most typical label is “conspiracy theorist,” usually leveled as a hostile epithet instead of embraced by the “conspiracy theorist” himself.
It is no surprise that normally these sensible analyses are defined by different “extremists” who are outside the Facility consensus. For it is crucial to the continued rule of the State device that it have legitimacy and even sanctity in the eyes of the public, and it is crucial to that sanctity that our politicians and bureaucrats be deemed to be disembodied spirits entirely dedicated to the “public good.” Once let the cat out of the bag that these spirits are all frequently grounded in the strong earth of advancing a set of financial interests through usage of the State, and the fundamental mystique of federal government begins to collapse.
Let us take an easy example. Suppose we find that Congress has passed a law raising the steel tariff or enforcing import quotas on steel? Definitely just an idiot will fail to understand that the tariff or quota was passed at the behest of lobbyists from the domestic steel market, distressed to stay out effective foreign competitors. No one would level a charge of “conspiracy theorist” against such a conclusion. But what the conspiracy theorist is doing is merely to extend his analysis to more complicated measures of government: say, to public works projects, the establishment of the ICC, the production of the Federal Reserve System, or the entry of the United States into a war. In each of these cases, the conspiracy theorist asks himself the question cui bono!. ?. !? Who benefitsfrom this measure? If he discovers that Step A benefits X and Y, his next action is to examine the hypothesis: didX and Y in truth lobby or put in pressure for the passage of Measure A? In other words, did X and Y recognize that they would benefit and act accordingly?
Far from being a paranoid or a determinist, the conspiracy analyst is a praxeologist; that is, he thinks that individuals act purposively, that they make mindful choices to employ methods in order to come to goals. Hence, if a steel tariff is passed, he assumes that the steel market lobbied for it; if a public works project is produced, he hypothesizes that it was promoted by an alliance of building companies and unions who took pleasure in public works contracts, and bureaucrats who expanded their jobs and earnings. It is the challengers of “conspiracy” analysis who profess to believe that all events– at least in federal government– are random and unintended, which for that reason individuals do not participate in purposive choice and preparation.
There are, naturally, excellent conspiracy experts and bad conspiracy analysts, simply as there are excellent and bad historians or practitioners of any discipline. The bad conspiracy analyst tends to make 2 sort of mistakes, which undoubtedly leave him open to the Facility charge of “fear.” First, he stopswith the cui bono;if procedure A benefits X and Y, he merely concludes that for that reasonX and Y were accountable. He fails to recognize that this is simply a hypothesis, and need to be validated by discovering whether X and Y really did so. (Possibly the wackiest example of this was the British journalist Douglas Reed who, seeing that the outcome of Hitler’s policies was the damage of Germany, concluded, without additional proof, that for that reasonHitler was a conscious representative of external forces who intentionally set out to mess up Germany.) Secondly, the bad conspiracy analyst seems to have a compulsion to finish up all the conspiracies, all the bad person power blocs, into one giant conspiracy. Rather of seeing that there are a number of power blocs attempting to gain control of federal government, sometimes in dispute and often in alliance, he needs to assume– once again without proof– that a small group of males controls them all, and only seemsto send them into dispute.
These reflections are prompted by the practically blatant truth– so outright as to be remarked on by the significant newsweeklies– that practically the whole top leadership of the brand-new Carter administration, from Carter and Mondale on down, are members of the small, semisecret Trilateral Commission, established by David Rockefeller in 1973 to propose policies for the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, and/or members of the board of the Rockefeller Structure. The rest are connected Atlanta business interests, and particularly the Coca-Cola Company, Georgia’s major corporation.
Well, how do we take a look at all this? Do we state that David Rockefeller’s prodigious efforts on behalf of specific statist public policies are simply a reflection of unfocused selflessness? Or exists pursuit of economic interest involved? Was Jimmy Carter named a member of the Trilateral Commission as soon as it was founded since Rockefeller and the others wished to hear the knowledge of an unknown Georgia governor? Or was he plucked out of obscurity and made President by their assistance? Was J. Paul Austin, head of Coca-Cola, an early supporter of Jimmy Carter simply out of issue for the common good? Were all the Trilateralists and Rockefeller Foundation and Coca-Cola individuals selected by Carter simply because he felt that they were the ablest possible people for the task? If so, it’s a coincidence that knocks one’s socks off. Or are there more sinister political-economic interests involved? I submit that the naïfs who stubbornly refuse to take a look at the interplay of political and economic interest in federal government are tossing away a necessary tool for analyzing the world in which we live.
This post initially appeared in Reason, April 1977, pp. 39– 40.