NATO feels no requirement to concede. Nor does it feel under any moral or political commitment to do so. Russia, on the other hand, is not the Russia of the 1990s, states Paul Robinson in an interview with SCF.
In some cases things get so bad that one party feels it is best just to walk away from the relationship. That thinking, keeps in mind Professor Paul Robinson in the following interview, appears to be behind Russia’s recent choice to cut diplomatic relate to the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia has actually likewise rebuffed relations with the European Union, lamenting that they also have actually broken down and become inefficient. These relocations do not represent an ominous Russian agenda, according to Robinson. It just reflects a frustration with and disillusionment in diplomatic channels that Moscow has pursued over a number of decades with both blocs. Henceforth, it may be more efficient for Moscow to handle specific states on a bilateral basis instead of through mediation with collective groups. This is because, as Robinson discusses, both NATO and the EU have actually become overloaded with “groupthink” and “group polarization” whereby the blocs have actually embraced incredibly prejudicial mindsets towards Russia. Paradoxically, the group position tends to be not representative of all specific members. He cautions, however, that stress in between East and West might continue and even escalate.
Paul Robinson’s bio consists of currently being Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa where he teaches Russian and military history, among other topics. He writes thoroughly for worldwide media on relations in between Russia and the West. Prior to graduate research studies at Toronto and Oxford Universities, he functioned as a routine officer in the British Army Intelligence Corps from 1989 to 1994, and as a reserve officer in the Canadian Forces from 1994 to 1996. He likewise worked as a media research executive in Moscow in 1995. Robinson is the author of six books, consisting of Russian Conservatism: An Ideology or a Natural Attitude?
Interview
Question: You recently described the now suspended NATO-Russia Council as something of a “charade”– where little was accomplished in regards to significant interaction in between NATO and Russia. Why was this forum so inadequate? Moscow claims its views were not being listened to. Is that an affordable grievance?
Paul Robinson: I think that there were perhaps clashing expectations on both sides regarding what such an arrangement was for and what it might achieve, which led both of them to feel frustrated with the outcomes. Eventually, the issue is that they have different understandings of their interests. As the more powerful party, NATO feels no requirement to yield. Nor does it feel under any moral or political responsibility to do so. Russia, on the other hand, is not the Russia of the 1990s, when NATO-Russia cooperation began. It is more powerful, more confident, more self-assertive. It too is not in a state of mind to yield. The outcome is an ever-growing fight.
Concern: Russia appears to be now moving toward trying to establish bilateral interactions with individual members of NATO. You have mentioned the problem of “groupthink” and “group polarization”. Can you elaborate on how those dynamics run and how they limited NATO dialogue with Russia?
Paul Robinson: Groupthink tends to reduce dissent, as dissenters do not want to cause problem or stand out from the crowd. The dominating narrative or dominant position for that reason tends to go undisputed. And, naturally, the more it goes unchallenged, the more it ends up being accepted as gospel fact and the more difficult it is to counter it. At present, the dominant narrative in the West is the malign nature of the “Putin regime” and of Russian foreign and defense policy. Groupthink indicates that even if somebody within NATO disagreed with this, they would be unlikely to challenge it.
Group polarization works a little in a different way. It is a procedure whereby conversation pushes members of a group towards extremes, generally towards an extreme variation of the dominant position at the start. Within the EU and NATO, this procedure has actually ended up being more noticable, I believe, given that the addition of eastern European states, some of whom, especially Poland and the Baltic States, are extremely hostile towards Russia. Their existence within the EU and NATO has pressed those companies towards a more extreme variation of anti-Russianism than would otherwise have actually held true. Both organizations work on agreement, and to reach agreement they yield to the most Russophobic aspects.
Question: There appears to be an example with how Russia’s diplomatic negotiations with NATO have actually also appeared with regard to Russia’s relations with the European Union as a bloc. Would you concur that there is something of the exact same sort of characteristics at play frustrating significant discussion?
Paul Robinson: The EU and NATO have similar membership but are constructed in various ways. EU decision-making is very intricate, and it requires the contract of practically all involved. As an outcome, it can be very hard for the EU to come to any sort of choice, let alone pertained to it rapidly. This can make handling the EU very frustrating for outdoors parties, who for that reason choose to handle specific members. In addition to that, the EU, like NATO, has to take into account the deeply anti-Russian stances of some of its members, and as such will constantly be more anti-Russia than will much of the EU’s membership. This supplies another incentive for Russia to skirt EU organizations whenever possible and deal with members one on one.
Question: No doubt Russia will now be accused especially of trying to split Western alliances by going down the path of choosing bilateral settlements with specific nations. How do you ascertain Russia’s motives? Is it authentic reaching out, or something more Machiavellian?
Paul Robinson: I do not see anything Machiavellian in what Russia is doing. While some will implicate it of attempting to divide NATO and the EU, in truth it’s simply pursuing its national interests, and it finds it much easier to do so bilaterally than by dealing with NATO and/or the EU. That’s truly all there is to it.
Question: You have revealed doubt about Moscow’s political prudence in closing down the NATO diplomatic links, suggesting that the relocation leaves Russia open to criticism of being non-communicative and intensifying currently laden relations with the West. Nevertheless, do you not think it is much better to clarify, so to speak, and disabuse any impressions of “partnership”?
Paul Robinson: There are possibly times when things get so bad that the only thing left to do is leave. Plainly, Moscow has chosen that time is now. I think that the action is more symbolic than anything else, as the diplomatic links were not achieving anything positive in practice. If relations enhance, the links can be rather easily brought back. I believe, though, that is extremely not likely for a long time, if ever. The rift seems quite irreversible and I am not optimistic for a reduction of East-West tensions.
Concern: At the most recent NATO summit of defense ministers held last week there were the familiar allegations of Russia threatening Europe’s security which of Ukraine in particular. Moscow, on the other hand, points to NATO expansion over many years in breach of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, in addition to more just recently providing Ukraine with billions of dollars worth of deadly weaponry. Which story is more credible: Russia as aggressor, or NATO as assailant?
Paul Robinson: I think about the situation to be a traditional example of what international scholars call the “security predicament”. Shared suspicions lead each side to take measures to defend themselves versus the other; those procedures are then viewed as threatening by the other party, triggering additional steps, which are in turn viewed as threatening, therefore inducing yet more procedures, and so on, in a procedure of escalation. So, Russian actions to secure itself induce fear in NATO, which takes action to safeguard itself, which induces fear in Moscow, which takes procedures, etc, etc. Once you’re on this spiral, it’s difficult to leave.
Question: U.S. President Joe Biden discusses not desiring a Cold War with China or Russia. But U.S. conduct and policy contradicts this seeming goal of not wanting fight. What is happening with U.S. policy? Is it deception, duplicity or plain incoherence with nobody in control?
Paul Robinson: I do not believe that this is duplicity. I do think that policy is inadequately analyzed, and the most likely responses of China and Russia to U.S. policy are not properly considered. This may be in part because policy is seldom coherent in the sense of being the item of a single will, resulting in a single, clear goal with actions being collaborated carefully with that goal. Numerous, typically contending interest groups add to policy-making. Economic interests dictate excellent relations with China. But the military-industrial complex profits from depicting China as a harmful threat. And so on. The result is some sort of compromise in which the state looks for both to have great relations with China and to “include”/”deter” China in such a way that of course threatens it and might contribute to intensifying relations. The fact that the various elements of policy do not fit each other well is merely an item of how policy is made in a large, complex state such as the USA.
Question: What steps need to be taken by the United States, Russia and China in order to reduce stress and enhance international security?
Paul Robinson: Those included need a little less self-assurance and a bit more understanding of the opposite’s point of view. Military expenses need to be cut– war in between the large powers is unimaginable, given the destruction it would trigger, so in my opinion there is no justification for the majority of the military capacity presently deployed and being established. The reality is that the wealthiest parts of the world live in significant security. This is particularly true of countries in the West: we have no need for military abilities. By reducing them we would send out positive signals to other parties that could help cut through the Gordian knot of the security problem and help to de-escalate worldwide stress.