By Patrick ARMSTRONG
To Moscow, Ukraine is not the problem, Washington is. Or, as Putin might put it: Tabaqui does what Shere Khan informs him to and there is no point in dealing with him, go directly to Shere Khan. That is what Moscow is attempting to do with its treaty propositions.
For the very same factor, Moscow is not much interested in what the EU or NATO says; it evaluates that they are Tabaquis too.
The current propaganda meme in Washington is that Russia is going to “attack Ukraine” and absorb it. It will not: Ukraine is a rotting, impoverished, de-industrialised, divided, corrupt and decaying mess; Moscow does not want to take obligation for the package. Moscow is completely mindful that while its soldiers will be invited in numerous parts of Ukraine they will not remain in others. Undoubtedly, in Moscow, they should be wanting that Stalin had returned Galicia to Poland instead of giving it to the Ukrainian SSR after the War and stuck Warsaw with the problem. This does not, however, rule out the eventual absorption of most of Novorossiyain ultimo.
The second delusion in Washington is that if Moscow did “invade Ukraine” it would start as far away from Kiev as possible and send out tank after tank down a road so that the US-supplied PAWs could exact a heavy cost. That is absolutely not what Moscow would do as Scott Ritter describes. Moscow would utilize standoff weapons to wipe out Ukrainian troop positions, C3I properties, assembly locations, weapons positions, ammo disposes, airfields, ports and so forth. At its choice. It would all be over quite rapidly and the Javelins would never be taken out of their boxes. But that is the extreme alternative as Ritter explains.
Sadly the Blinkens, Sullivans, Farkas’, Nulands and others who seem to be driving USA policy do not comprehend any of this. They remain persuaded that the United States is a magnificent power, that Russia is weak and fading, that Putin’s position is unsteady, that sanctions are biting, that Russia’s economy is weak and so on. And that they understand modern warfare. Everything in the previous twenty years contradicts their view but they hold to it nonetheless.
Take, for instance, Wendy Sherman who was the primary American negotiator in Geneva this month. Look at her bio on Wikipedia. Social worker, money raiser for Democratic Celebration candidates, political project manager, Fanny Mae, Clinton appointee to the State Department, arbitrator with Iran and North Korea. Exists anything because record to show any understanding or understanding of Russia or modern war? (Or skill at negotiations for that matter?) And yet she’s the one on point. Jake Sullivan: legal representative, dispute preparer, political advisor, ditto.
Maybe there’s an American basic officer who sees truth– definitely there are those who have spoken of Russia’s powerful air defence or EW capabilities; others understand how weak NATO would remain in a war on Russia’s house field. But, as Colonel Lang points out, maybe not.
Overconfidence rooted on absolutely nothing is the problem. Moscow has made a proposition that is based upon the unquestionably real position that security is shared. If one side threatens the other, then the threatened one will take actions to fortify its position and the threat level will rise and rise. During the Cold War both sides understood that there were limitations, that hazards were dangerous which negotiating prevented worse things from occurring. But Washington is lost in its misconception of long lasting supremacy.
The so-called “Thucydides trap” is the name offered to a condition when one power (Sparta then, U.S.A. now) fears the rising power of (Athens then, China and Russia today) and begins a war due to the fact that it fears its position can only deteriorate. The ruthless reality is that point has currently been passed: Russia+China are more powerful than the U.S.A. and its allies in every quantifiable matter– more steel, more food, more guns, more STEM, more bridges, more money– more everything. NATO/US would lose a traditional war– American military wargamers understand this to be true.
In short, how can Moscow force these people to see reality? This, in a word, is the problem: if they can see it, then something much better is possible; if they can’t, then it’s the even worse. For everyone’s sake– Washington’s too– Washington needs to focus on Moscow’s security concerns and dial down its hostilities. Moscow has actually asked– required really– and it’s not yet clear that the attempt has stopped working. The unfavorable response of the Tabaquis does not matter– Moscow only talked to them as a matter of type– it’s Shere Khan’s response that matters. And we haven’t had it yet.
Maybe the aborted colour transformation in Kazakhstan was an answer from some portion of the US deep state/Borg but, if so, it was a swift and powerful demonstration of how poor an understanding of the true correlation of forces the US deep state has.
We wait for Washington’s final response but the potential customers are not very encouraging at the minute: the cheap risks and bragging op-edspour out. So what is Moscow’s Plan B?
I have in other places listed some responses that I can imagineand others have actually done so too. I am thinking that Moscow has to do something pretty significant to shatter the complacency. I see three primary fronts.
- The United States has not been threatened with a conventional attack on its house territory considering that 1814; Russia has several ways that it can do so. The problem will be to reveal the danger in a way that can not be denied or hidden. A demonstration of Poseidon’s capabilities on some island someplace followed by the statement that a considerable number are currently released near US seaside cities?
- Washington should be presented with a demonstration of Russia’s enormous devastating military power that it can not pretend away. Ukraine is the apparent field for such a presentation. (See Ritter).
- A world-changing diplomatic relocation like a formal military alliance with China with an arrangement that an attack on one is an attack on both. This would be a demonstration of the connection of forces that not even the most deluded could miss out on. Mackinder’s Heartland plus population, plus production, plus STEM, plus resources, plus military and marine might participated a military pact.
We will see. The negotiations are not over and something better may originate from them. Doctorow, a capable observer, provides some hope. But to get to a much better outcome would require a quite major modification in mindset in Washington.
We can hope. The stakes are high.