The US and other countries of the Western world are divided by ever more stark ideological distinctions, to put it slightly. Due to the fact that most people live in societies where the power to make a few of the most important choices and to utilize offensive force to effect them is concentrated in the state, these increasing differences of opinion are raising the stakes of losing or doing not have political power. Appropriately, all type of people have begun to take an interest in political secession and decentralization as an option to the intensifying power battles.
But one of the critiques of the secession-decentralization technique is that it apparently leads to spread populations vulnerable to military conquest which the model is troublesome when it pertains to trade, take a trip, and communication. The idea is that a single strong state is the most protected and the most practical alternative. The example of pre-Hispanic and early modern Mayan civilization offers a powerful retort to this argument, as we will see. Ethnically and linguistically similar however divided into scores of smaller sized states linked by long-distance trade networks, Mayas had the ability to escape homegrown tyranny for centuries and resisted foreign Spanish conquest for centuries.
Pre-Hispanic Mayan Civilization: A Wide Variety of Regional States and City-States
Fixated the Yucatan Peninsula, pre-Hispanic Mayan civilization grew in what is now southern Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, and Honduras, not far south of the Aztec Empire. Unlike its next-door neighbor, the Mayan civilization was never a central empire. Rather, the land was a patchwork of little states scrambling one another for power, a number of whom were connected by different military alliances and long-distance trade networks. In the twenty-five hundred years from the rise of Mayan civilization to the Spanish conquest, political researchers Claudio Cioffi-Revilla and Todd Landman have identified seventy-two significant Mayan chiefdoms (akin to city-states) and local states (judgment over tiers of municipalities), noting the presence, in addition, of hundreds of smaller sized polities, though these were mainly “minor by contrast” and were not consisted of in their study.
The Classic-Era Maya World: Many Strong States and Centralized Domestic Politics
The most central period in Mayan history was the Timeless period (approximately 250– 950 ADVERTISEMENT). As anthropologist Antonia E. Foias discusses, “At the heart of Classic Maya polities was the magnificent ruler, or k’uhul ajaw, who lived in the royal court in the epicenter of an independent political capital, from which he performed the affairs of the state.” The k’uhul ajaw’s rule was matched by two to four strata of political authorities and the royal household. The political elite enriched itself through the goods that they expropriated from citizens and subordinate states (if any) as tribute, as well as through their subjects’ labor, which they utilized in huge public works projects. Power was focused in the k’uhul ajaw, however, who was deified and whose reign and its events were honored in big stone monoliths called stelae.
The Classic era was marked by the development of states, a growing variety of polities born through fissure, and the rise of a number of enormous cities with a strong regional influence. As Hispanicist Lynn V. Foster describes,
The 100 years beginning around 672 saw the blooming of numerous excellent cities … Competition amongst these Maya cities sustained more wars and demand for tribute; wealth created building booms and increased production of luxury goods. The result was a period fraught with political stress and warfare but likewise one in which creative production culminated in the best works of Maya civilization.
But although secession produced more states, they were tainted by the conceit of political advantage internally and externally. From approximately the 600s to the 900s, as Foias describes,
[t] he elite class grew in numbers and authorities as hieroglyphic texts and monuments that had actually formerly been specifically related to Early Traditional royals ended up being more extensive … More and smaller sites stated themselves independent seats of royal power with their own emblem glyphs … The substantial honorable class and the increasing number of royals need to have felt intense competition as locations of possible expansion diminished over time and as warfare continued and intensified.
For reasons that are heavily disputed and multifaceted– but that very likely have something to do with these states’ expansionist ambitions and the war and rising economic exploitation they required– Mayan civilization suffered a political “collapse” at the end of the Traditional period that saw the dissolution of a lot of the existing states between approximately 800 and 1100. The collapse was “marked by desertion, migrations, death, and other terminal modes of political extinction– not by combination or integration into less, bigger, or more complex polities,” as Cioffi-Revilla and Landman, who see the Mayan civilization’s absence of political combination as a failure and the root of its demise, take pains to stress. Contrary to the term’s undertones, the so-called collapse likewise saw the increase of lots of brand-new smaller sized polities and ushered in a period of increased political decentralization.
The Postclassic Maya World: More Petty States, More Trade, More Flexibility
The Postclassic age (950– 1542) saw the rise of brand-new powers, but this time there were fewer big regional states and more city-state chiefdoms, and Cioffi-Revilla and Landman tape-recorded less “substantial” polities overall. Foias describes the Postclassic geopolitical landscape as ranging from
the small Yucatec cah [” the basic Maya municipal community consisting of both the domestic site and the territorial lands managed by the town”] ruled by a batab [regional ruler] to regional polities ruled by a halach uinic [local overlord] to the militarized and broadening states of the K’ich’ean kingdoms of highland Guatemala and lastly to the hegemony of the Itza in the Central Peten lowlands.
The stelae to rulers disappeared, there were less costly huge tasks, more trade, and the source of political power widened to incorporate the elite court of the halach uinic in the larger states and regional councils. During this duration states do not seem to have interfered much in individuals’s production of products, which continued to be geared towards local markets and local trade networks, beyond, naturally, parasitically siphoning off part of it. As a result, there was a lot of entrepreneurial activity, social movement, and a “extensively incorporated mercantile economy.” Mayanists Marilyn A. Masson and Carlos Peraza Lope observe that” [t] he circulation of many classes of material in households of all sizes suggests that opportunities for financial abundance may have been fluid for some non-elites.” Elites “maintained their differences … through investment in domestic and ritual architecture and through the control of crucial calendrical events celebrated at Maya neighborhoods.”
Regrettably, though they were an improvement over the more expansionist states of the Timeless period, the Postclassic-era Mayan states also had the issue of completing for power, and the duration was afflicted by war, as suggested by the prominence of war motifs in artwork and the occurrence of protective walls. Cioffi-Revilla and Landman appropriately trace a second political collapse beginning in the 1490s, just after the circa-1450 fall of the big local power of Mayapán (present-day Yucatán State, Mexico), and predating the Spanish conquest and in reality continuing through it. Obviously, sovereign Mayan civilization ultimately stopped working to rebound from this collapse and was subsumed under the Spanish and Latin American states.
However the conquest of the Mayas was extremely protracted, just completed centuries after contact. And the death of Mayapán was likewise the birth of at least sixteen minor states. The Mayan tale of several decentralized polities followed by the rise of big bellicose states, the birth of more little (but not always unambitious) states through secession, and, finally, the political collapse of many of these states, both big and small, for that reason, is not one of decentralization’s failure, as Cioffi-Revilla and Landman contend.
The collapse of a state must never be equated with the death of a people, and, in truth, frequently such an occasion ushers in their freedom, if short-lived, from state tyranny, along with more humble and therefore more accommodative political plans. Cioffi-Revilla and Landman’s own model of two cycles of political “development” and “collapse”– which, keep in mind, leaves out the tiniest polities and consequently downplays the degree of decentralization prior to and the variety of states during the “collapses”– reveals this.
Although the Mayan civilization’s structure of many decentralized states was still afflicted by the concern of private states’ attempts to expand and centralize authority, the structure enabled Mayan topics greater power to precise political retribution on the most exploitative, aggressive states. How did Mayan commoners penalize the political class? Simple. They abandoned them, typically following an enthusiastic (or power-envious) faction of the elite as they clove into a brand-new state, as occurred at Mayapán. Undoubtedly, throughout the late Classic and early Postclassic periods, the populations of seaside Belize, highland Guatemala, and northern Yucatan grew as numerous Classic-era cities were being deserted. As Mayanist and archaeologist Takeshi Inomata argues, Classic-era Mayan nonelites had “a certain level of spatial mobility and of the freedom to change political affiliation.” Foias seconds this, noting that” [t] he low labor financial investment of Maya citizens in home building and farming suggests that they may have been relatively mobile.” This tradition of movement continued into the Hispanic age, and as we will see, the Mayan fondness for elite-driven secession and ballot with one’s feet allowed Mayan sovereignty to persist for far longer than the most recent political elite ever expected.
The Hispanic Conquest of the Mayas, 1517– 1697 … and 1847– 1901
The Spanish monarchical state’s efforts to absorb Mayan territory began with failure in 1517, when Francisco Hernández de Córdoba and his males were ambushed at Cabo Catoche (contemporary Quintana Roo State, Mexico), threatened at Campeche (or Can Pech, contemporary Campeche City, Campeche State, Mexico), ran away, and then were assaulted near Champotón (contemporary Campeche State, Mexico) when they came ashore again for water after attempting to communicate tranquil intent to the locals.
The next year, Juan de Grijalba was much better prepared to challenge the Mayas at Champotón, stopping there on the way back to Cuba to avenge the last expedition. The locals fought back hard, injuring lots of, however they were forced to get away. The only three people the conquistadors found in the city were sent to fetch the ruler with an expected peace offering, however they never returned. Grijalba next came near Potonchán (present-day Tabasco State, Mexico). Having found out about the goings-on at Champotón, the Chontal Mayas of Tabasco cautioned Grijalba versus assaulting them, saying that they had many soldiers ready at their capital and in the area. Grijalba reassured them of his tranquil intentions and the two sides traded. Grijalba returned to Cuba without having actually established a head office.
The infamous Hernán Cortés followed Grijalba in 1519 and was gotten with hostility at Potonchán, however. Cortés managed to beat the Mayas of Tabasco and founded a town called Santa Maria de la Victoria at the website of the Mayan capital. The locals made peace with the Spanish state by making Cortés a tribute offering of items and ladies and became vassals of the crown, though this alliance appears to have actually been fleeting. Cortés, of course, then made his method north to conquer the Aztecs (whose riches and substantial area Grijalba had ended up being conscious of throughout his expedition), alternately conquering and allying with individuals residing in between.
Spain’s paid mercenaries had much better luck in what is now Guatemala. There, Pedro de Alvarado dominated the substantial predatory Quiché state in 1524, developing a capital at Iximché, a city controlled by his Cakchiquel Mayan allies (who, by the way, had actually seceded from the Quiché in 1475). Still, Alvarado’s success was precarious: the Cakchiquel allies revolted and Alvarado was forced to move the capital in 1527. The Spanish sustained Cakchiquel hostilities for several years, however this time they managed to hold their position: a mudslide from a close-by volcano ruined the city in 1541, however it was soon restored for excellent at present-day Antigua, Guatemala.
The Spanish crown’s claim to the Yucatan stayed weak and disputed after Grijalba’s 1518 success at Champotón. Later on efforts to conquer the Yucatan did not fare better initially: Francisco de Montejo’s 1527– 28 and 1531– 34 projects both ended in retreat and the desertion of several fort “towns” they had actually established at or near dominated Maya cities, though Montejo did be successful in subduing the Mayas of surrounding Tabasco (who apparently did not remain passive after their 1519 defeat), and founding a town called Salamanca in 1529 (contemporary Tabasco State, Mexico). On the fifth try, the Spanish state lastly dominated the Yucatec Mayas. In 1541 Montejo’s child and namesake produced a head office at Campeche, where lots of local Maya leaders submitted to the Spanish state without resistance after being summoned. After beating the Canul Mayan state, which would not come quietly, Montejo established a firm foothold at Mérida (contemporary Yucatán State, Mexico) in 1542, on the ruins of Ti’ho (or T’hó).
However Mérida’s starting was not the end of the story. Although the Mayan states of the western Yucatan stayed down, the numerous eastern Yucatec polities– Cupul, Cochua, Sotuta, Chaktemal (or Chetumal), and Taze– rebelled numerous times, independently and in concert. They were not fully conquered until 1546, when the majority of them formed a confederation and were collectively defeated.
Many Mayas left Spanish guideline, deserting their cities and heading for settlements on the frontier. As Hispanicist Lynn V. Foster describes, “Quintana Roo, the eastern half of the Yucatán Peninsula, remained without Spaniards, and runaway Maya settled there. Others got away to established settlements in the Petén and Belize interior, such as Tah Itzá (Tayasal) [contemporary Flores, Petén Department, Guatemala] and Tipú [present-day Belize]” These remote areas were checked out only by missionaries, and on one celebration, in 1619, the latter were expelled violently from Tah Itzá. An attempt by the government of Yucatan to strike back in 1622 ended in defeat in 1624, with the Itzá Mayas keeping the conquistadors at bay for a number of years. In 1638, additionally, previously dominated Mayas of Dzuluinicob [contemporary Belize] and Chaktemal [present-day Chetumal, Quintana Roo State, Mexico] rose up and shook Spanish rule off again up until 1695. The Itzás remained independent till 1697, when the Spanish state finally dominated Tah Itzá, extinguishing the last residue of Mayan sovereignty.
Even after the dissolution of the last Mayan state, numerous Mayan neighborhoods persisted in the eastern Yucatan Peninsula, isolated and sovereign de facto. For example, Foster notes that the Lacandón Mayas “moved into the Usumacinta area around Bonampak [contemporary Chiapas State, Mexico], where they handled to elude immigrants till mahogany loggers encountered them in the 20th century.” In fact, the Caste War of Yucatán broke out in 1847, when independent Mayan communities saw their farmlands being trespassed on by sugar plantations (and Hispanic Mexican society by extension). After displacing many people from the area and damaging the sugar industry, many of these neighborhoods signed a truce in 1853 that allowed them to live semiautonomously in Chenes area of Campeche, but the Cruzob Mayas of Quintana Roo held out until 1901, when federal and Yucatec soldiers violently broke their rebellion. Even more stunning was the Movimimento Chamula of the 1860s, in which Mayas of the Ciudad Real district of Chiapas established their own non-Catholic sect and “a barter-based market independent of the church, teachers, merchants, and hacienda owners of Ciudad Real” in the town of Chamula. The Mayas laid siege to the location after the detention of the movement’s leaders, and the Mexican authorities were forced to release them. This revolt was not stopped till the 1870s.
Conclusion
Although the Mayan civilization was ultimately absorbed by Spanish and Latin American states, it took centuries to close the frontier, and a big factor for this was the Mayas’ geopolitical arrangement of myriad independent polities based on secession by disgruntled elites and desertion by unhappy commoners. Furthermore, although the issues intrinsic to states consistently resulted in developing diplomatic tensions among Mayan states and, as an outcome, pressure on their populations, political fragmentation and the weaker polities that would come of it appear to have enabled an appreciable scaling-back of endemic state tyranny and exploitation, even if not forever. That is certainly more than can be stated of the period of almost nonstop centralization the majority of the world finds itself in today.
It must be noted that despite their multiplicity and restricted jurisdiction, the state structures of Mayan civilization did have the effect of being a channel for Spanish state power postconquest (not to discuss control by imperialistic Mayan states). As Foster describes,
Initially, the Spaniards were too couple of to rule without the assistance of the Maya, so they replaced themselves for the Maya nobility at the top of the governmental hierarchy and left the remainder of the political hierarchy essentially undamaged. Maya family tree chiefs collected tribute for the Spaniards in the form of food, labor, clothing, and, in the Guatemala highlands, gold panning. In return, the Maya guvs were allowed to dress like Spanish gentlemen, trip horses, and even bring arms– and, obviously, continue to gather their own tribute and own their personal servants.
The state’s vulnerability to co-optation and its propensity for ever-increasing foreign and domestic hostility is something that supporters of the strategy of secession and decentralization must always bear in mind. Though political secession and decentralization can certainly roll back tyranny and increase liberty, the smaller sized states it develops are still constructed on a structure from which they can grow into steamrolling monstrosities given the leeway, in contrast to finish anarchy. Proponents of secession and decentralization need to be ready to withdraw once again, to move again, as Mayas did for centuries, if they are to maintain their gains. More crucially, they must continue to promote complete individual sovereignty as the supreme perfect if the cycle of interventionism is ever to be truly broken and genuinely voluntary societies based upon full private property rights established.