America Lost the Pacific War

Gary North – May 17, 2021 Printer-Friendly Format

From 2011. On December 7, 1941, the marine forces of the Empire of Japan introduced among the most ill-conceived, boneheaded military endeavors in history, one exceeded only by Adolph Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union the previous June.(Hitler then beguiled Japan once again, four days later, when he stated war on the United States, although he was not required to by the regards to the Axis pact, considering that Japan had actually started the war.)

That attack resulted in the destruction of the empire in 1945: the utter humiliation of the armed force; the turnaround of the country’s centuries-long honoring of military valor; the irreversible change of Japan’s desire to prosper by war and the adoption of a new objective, to be successful by tranquil financial competitors; and the abolition of the national armed forces, which continues to this day. This laid the structure of the best post-war economic healing in history.The attack caused a military reaction from the United States, which in retrospection marked the accomplishment of the forces preferring the development of an American empire over a consistent tradition of a non-interventionist diplomacy. It resulted in a wartime boost in the federal government’s debt on a scale not seen since the Civil War. It changed the military spending plan from one that can be described as a near-starvation diet plan in 1941 to a seventy-year bloat never ever seen before in male’s history. It led to the country’s retroactive honoring of the conscripted millions who went to war as “the greatest generation.” It resulted in the development of an empire that has 1,000 military and spy bases outside the territorial United States, and the production of an airplane carrier-based Navy that patrols the world in search of monsters to damage, to price estimate John Quincy Adams.This leads me to a questionable conclusion: Through the defeat of the Japanese armed force, Japan won the war in the Pacific. The United States lost it.THE WRONG REASONS The military leaders of the Empire in

the 1930s viewed the international economy in terms of a military-like, top-down pecking order. Japan required basic materials. It needed oil. To protect these important possessions, the military organizers created a program of conquest. The armed forces of Japan had actually been in control of Korea since 1910. Japan invaded China in order to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This would be a trading empire in which Japanese arms would extract raw materials and inexpensive labor.

The leaders did not see the free market as the primary source of the raw products the economy required. They did not see the world in terms of Adam Smith’s giant auction, in which the high financial quote normally wins. They saw it in terms of the domestic Japanese economy: a system of interrelated, family-related cartels. Even the armed force’s high command was shelled out in regards to families. One group of families was mostly marine. The other was connected to the army.This view of economic growth put the civil government at the center. The armed force was seen as the center of the civil government. There was no developed tradition of democratic rule, which was a Western import.This reliance on a military frame of mind resulted in a jiu-jitsu toss by the

Americans. The American central coordinators for domestic political factors needed to get Japan to fire the first shot. America’s main government withdrawed the right of producers to export maker tools, airplane parts, and aviation fuel to Japan in 1940. In 1941, America’s government even more interfered with the free enterprise and embargoed oil shipments to Japan. These were acts of justification. They worked. The Japanese military high command took the bait.THE WRONG TARGETS The attack was carefully prepared for almost a year in advance. The flyers were trained well. The carrier fleet had the ability to place itself so that its airplanes would show up on Sunday morning

, when the guys on board ships were either recuperating from hangovers, getting ready for church, or simply sleeping in.The story is well known. The scenes in Tora, Tora, Tora are etched into a lot of American movie-goers’minds. The attack was related to by both sides as a tactical success: couple of airplanes lost, lots of ships sunk.It remained in truth a tactical disaster.One factor for the catastrophe was understood at the time. The carriers were not in port. The airplanes sank strategically obsolescent battleships and support ships. The primary factor is rarely pointed out. It got some factor to consider in Edwin T. Layton’s co-authored account, And I Existed (Annapolis: Naval Institute

Press, 1985 ). Layton was at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. He spoke and read Japanese. On page 498, he tells of an informal visit in 1949 in between Capt. Roger Pineau, a co-author of the book, and numerous top-level Japanese officers in 1941. Pineau was a Japanese-speaking naval officer appointed to work as a scientist for Samuel Eliot Morison’s definitive history of the U. S. Navy in World War II. Layton offers this exceptional summary. Pineau asked one of the planners, Back Admiral Sadatoshi Tomioka, what the Japanese naval coordinators had approximated would be the lag time between the Pearl Harbor attack and an American offending reaction. Tomioka said 12 to 18 months. Pineau then asked how long it had considered the American fleet to react. Layton stated that Tomioka did not react instantly. He was deep in thought, as if nobody had actually ever asked him this prior to. Then he said that it was the carrier-based attacks in the Marianas and Gilberts. That remained in February 1942. Reaction time: 2 months.Then Pineau showed him photos of the attack on Ford Island. The Admiral acknowledged the area. Pineau then pointed to some white items in the background. Did Tomioka understand what those were? He did: fuel tanks. He asked the Admiral how many airplanes had been designated to secure those tanks. The response: none.”Just your capital ships and airfields were designated as targets. “Pineau then discussed that if the planes had gotten all of the tanks in the area, the American providers could not have actually sailed out of Pearl. Pearl had to be re-supplied from California. If the Japanese Navy had actually positioned submarines east of Oahu to sink the oil tankers, the fleet would have been immobilized for 12 to 18 months.Tomioka sat there, shocked. So did the other personnel officers. Then he responded,”Pineau-san, you must have been in the Japanese navy”(p. 499 ). The airplanes could have gotten 4.5 million barrels of oil. They might have taken out the factory, where the providers were later repaired. They didn’t. The military coordinators had done what military coordinators do: create the conflict to remove the enemy’s weapons of war.

However they forgot to follow the chain of domino effect back to the very first cause. They forgot to plan for a way to paralyze the source of the weapons’power: fuel and repairs facilities.On June 5, 1942, airplanes from three U. S. carriers sank all four of Japan’s largest providers, the ones that had actually brought the aircrafts to Pearl. The Americans lost one provider. That was the fightof

Midway, the greatest naval success in American history. How was this possible? Three things: fuel, repair facilities, and IBM devices and punch cards, by which a code-breaking group cracked enough of Japan’s marine code to know when and really near where the Japanese fleet would arrive at Midway.Central preparation has enormous weaknesses. It constantly leaves out crucial facts. It produces results the opposite from what the organizers had actually prepared. Pearl Harbor is a fine example.In 1945, the Empire of Japan ended. It has never ever restored. THE REPLACEMENT EMPIRE The American Empire began early, no later than the Louisiana Purchase. The annexation of Mexican territory in the war with Mexico, 1846-48, was surely an expansion of empire. However the process made a breakthrough in the after-effects of the Spanish-American War in 1898. America took control of the residues of Spain’s faltering empire: Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The American suppression of the Philippine insurgents, 1898-1902, gets little or no area in the history textbooks. About 4,000 American soldiers died, perhaps 20,000 Filipino troops, and 500,000 civilians. Then the Empire stopped to

broaden much. For the next four decades, it entered into a kind of debt consolidation phase.World War II ended this. In the consequences of the War, the United States signed its first shared defense treaty, NATO(1949 ), the very first since the abrogation in 1800 of the treaty with France of 1778. The Cold War led us into a series of wars that Congress did not trouble to declare, in opposition to the Constitution.This country is still involved in one of these wars. The other formally ends this month with the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, at the demand of the government of Iraq. We are pleasantly being tossed out. The” cakewalk”will at long last concerned an end, except for the$750 million embassy and thousands of Iraqi mercenaries who are still on the U.S. payroll. CONCLUSION Japan’s military federal government introduced a sneak attack on the United States in 1941. In reaction, the United States

military waged an effective war against Japan.Japan’s military lost face in 1945. Representatively, the entire nation lost face. This made the nation easier to rule in the six-year occupation that followed. It changed the moral outlook of individuals. It ended militarism. There are couple of examples to match it in history,

and none on a scale this large or two fast. The greatest gift that America’s Occupation gave to Japan was the trio of consultants sent by Bell Laboratories to advise the Allied Command relating to the remediation of the country’s communications system. They arrived in 1945. They remained. One of them provided Japanese industryits very first quality control handbook in 1950. The analytical management promoter, W. Edwards Deming, was likewise in Japan at the time, however he did not have the

impact of these three.

They were backed by the Profession forces. Their story is informed in chapter 10 of the Hopper siblings’crucial book on the accomplishment and decline of American management, The Puritan Present(2007)

. Japan has been defended militarily by the United States since. Safeguarded from whom? This is unclear. What is clear is that Japan has actually not had to fund a military establishment ever since 1945. This freed up capital for more efficient purposes.We have paid to safeguard Japan considering that 1945. We have actually kept our carriers in Japanese ports. We have actually been the conquering empire.The surrender

of Japan on the battleship Missouri in 1945 marked the exchange of empires. Japan has never ever recalled. Neither have we. A pity. ____________________ Published on December 7, 2011. That was the 70th anniversary of the attack. This December will mark the 80th. The initial is here.

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